


FA2024 Week 08 • 2024-10-27 Cryptography II

Emma and Richard

Announcements

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CRYPTOGRAPHY CONFERENCES EVER SINCE IT BECAME CLEAR THAT ALL MY ALGORITHMS WERE JUST THINLY DISGUISED MISSY ELLIGTT SONGS.



Overview

- Modular Arithmetic
 - Chinese Remainder Theorem
 - Factoring
- RSA
 - Common attacks



Small vs Large n

- Modular arithmetic
 - Arithmetic mod n is the remainder after division with n
 - Information lost when finding values for mod n



Small vs Large n

- Suppose I ask you to find 4 * 4 mod 3
 - The result is 1, pretty straightforward if you're comfortable with modular arithmetic
- Now I tell you $x \equiv 1 \mod 3$ and ask you to find x / 4
 - Much harder



Small vs Large n

- Now suppose I ask you to find 4 * 4 mod 20
 - The result is 16, also pretty straightforward
- Now I tell you $x \equiv 16 \mod 20$ and ask you to find x / 4
 - Much easier by comparison!
- What can we do with this?



The Chinese Remainder Theorem

- Ancient theorem dating back to 3rd century
- Let's try to find x such that $0 \le x \le 105$. Additionally, we are given the following information

 $x \equiv 2 \pmod{3}$ $x \equiv 3 \pmod{5}$ $x \equiv 2 \pmod{7}$

- According to the Chinese Remainder Theorem, $x \equiv 23 \pmod{3 * 5 * 7} = 105$



The Chinese Remainder Theorem

- More generally speaking, let's say we have:

 $x \equiv n_{1} \pmod{p_{1}}$ $x \equiv n_{2} \pmod{p_{2}}$

 $x \equiv n_k \pmod{p_k}$

 Because p_i and p_j share no common factors whenever i ≠ j, we have a unique solution for x (mod p₁p₂...p_k)




Why Should I Care?

- Cryptographic systems using modular arithmetic (many modern cryptographic systems) need to be careful with primes
- Smooth primes: primes p such that p 1 has many small factors
 - Pohlig-Hellman algorithm
- CRT and Pohlig-Hellman used to attack TLS/SSL in 2015



Quick Refresher: Diffie-Hellman

- Alice and Bob arrive at a shared secret using their private secrets
- Works because of the discrete logarithm problem
- Diffie-Hellman used to share keys for symmetric encryption schemes
 - What about asymmetric encryption?





Asymmetric Encryption

- Public key
 - Intentionally broadcast for people to use
 - Anyone can use to encrypt a message to send us
- Private key
 - Keep to yourself
 - Use to decrypt other people's messages to us
- RSA is one example we will go into



Totients and Euler's Function

- We call $\phi(n)$ Euler's "totient" function
- $\phi(n)$ = the number of numbers ≥ 0 that share no factors with n
- Euler's Theorem: If a and n share no factors, then $a^{\phi}(n) \equiv 1 \pmod{n}$
- This theorem is the basis for the RSA cryptosystem



Activity: Quick Maths

- Multiply 7 and 7
 - 49
- Multiply 2048 and 3
 - 6144
- Factors of 49
 - 1, 7, 49
- Factors of 6144
 - 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 8, 12, 16, 24, 32, 48, 64, 96, 128, 192, 256, 384, 512, 768, 1024, 1536, 2048, 3072, 6144
- Factors of 32138210943
 - Uhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhh



The Hard Problem in RSA

- Multiplication is easy
- Factoring is hard
- Let p and q be large primes. If n = p * q, then $\phi(n) = (p - 1) * (q - 1)$
- Given n, since p and q are large, factoring is hard!
- Therefore, finding $\phi(n)$ is hard



The RSA Cryptosystem

- Let e be a public exponent, usually $e = 2^{16} + 1 = 65537$
- Alice generates large (> 256 or even > 512 bits) secret primes
 p, q
- Alice then calculates n = p * q and releases it as a public key. Then they calculate $\phi(n) = (p - 1) * (q - 1)$ as a private key.
- Knowing $\phi(n)$, compute d such that ed $\equiv 1 \pmod{\phi(n)}$
 - If you know $\phi(n)$, this is fast using the Extended Euclidian Algorithm
- Bob computes $c = m^e$ and sends it to Alice
- Then Alice can compute $c^d \equiv m \pmod{n}$



Correctness


- Remember, modular arithmetic is arithmetic using remainders
- So if a ≡ b (mod n) then we should have that a = b + kn for some k.
- ed \equiv 1 (mod $\phi(n)$). So ed = 1 + k $\cdot \phi(n)$ for some k
- $c^d \equiv (m^e)^d \equiv m^{ed} \equiv m^{1+k \cdot \phi(n)} \equiv m * (m^{\phi(n)})^k \equiv m * \mathbf{1}^k \equiv m \pmod{n}$




Attacks

- Small primes: brute forceable
- Smooth primes: Chinese Remainder Theorem
- Large public n or small φ(n): <u>Weiner's Attack</u>
- Oracles: Get your pen and paper, do the algebra!
- Ducks (Protip: Don't use pastebin.com as secret storage)
- etc... (Google is your best friend)







Challenges

- Cryptohack!



Learn with fantastic lessons and challenges, and earn points on PwnyCTF while you're at it!

<u>ctf.sigpwny.com/challenges#Meetin</u> <u>gs/CryptoHack</u>



Next Meetings

2024-10-31 • Next Thursday

- Halloween 👻

2024-11-03 • Next Sunday

- pwn II (format string attacks, control flow hijacking) with Sam



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Meeting content can be found at sigpwny.com/meetings.

