FA2022 Week 12

Forensics

Minh




Announcements

- Sunshine CTF 2022
 - Starts this Saturday at 9AM
 - Completely virtual because of fall break
 - We are trying to get top 50 in the world on CTFtime!

- Fall break
 - No meeting this Sunday or next Thursday and Sunday



ctf.sigpwny.com sigpwny{guess_god}





What is Digital Forensics?

- File Forensics
 - Requires understanding of a file format
 - Data can be hidden within the format (steganography)
- Filesystem Forensics
 - We conduct forensics to determine what happened on a system in a holistic manner, usually after some sort of incident
- Memory Forensics
 - Different from traditional filesystem forensics: we are given the contents of RAM in the form of a dump file
 - Given a memory dump, what information can we extract from it?

File Forensics



file

Is a file really what is says it is? Can a file be opened in a different way? Don't always trust the extension!

file uses "magic bytes" or a file signature to determine the format of a file (e.g. PNG files always start with 89 50 4E 47)

```
$ file unknown.txt
unknown.txt: JPEG image data, JFIF standard 1.01, aspect ratio, density 1x1,
segment length 16, progressive, precision 8, 400x400, components 3
```

Usage:

file <FILE>



binwalk

Finds files formats appended in a file (like file but recursive). For example, some binaries include their assets!

\$ binwalk cmd.exe										
DECIMAL HEXADECIMAL		DESCRIPTION								
0 235448 253789 283472 283534 294568 294609	0x0 0x397B8 0x3DF5D 0x45350 0x4538E 0x47EA8 0x47ED1	Microsoft executable, portable (PE) Copyright string: "Copyright (c) Microsoft Corpora mcrypt 2.5 encrypted data, algorithm: "o_exit", ke XML document, version: "1.0" Copyright string: "Copyright (c) Microsoft Corpora PNG image, 256 x 256, 8-bit/color RGBA, non-interl Zlib compressed data, default compression								

Usage:

binwalk <FILE> - View a list of contained file formats
binwalk -e <FILE> - Extract each file format from the file

strings

Lists plaintext strings that exist in a file, useful for binary files

Usage:

strings <FILE> - print all
strings of length 4 or greater

strings -n 16 <FILE> - print all strings of length 16 or greater

```
$ strings -n 16 cmd.exe
!This program cannot be run in DOS mode.
SetThreadUILanguage
Unknown exception
bad array new length
api-ms-win-core-winrt-l1-1-0.dll
ext-ms-win-branding-winbrand-l1-1-0.dll
ext-ms-win-cmd-util-l1-1-0.dll
ext-ms-win-appmodel-shellexecute-l1-1-0.dll
onecore\internal\sdk\inc\wil\opensource\wil\resource.h
WilFailureNotifyWatchers
RtlRegisterFeatureConfigurationChangeNotification
RtlUnregisterFeatureConfigurationChangeNotification
RtlNotifyFeatureUsage
NtQueryWnfStateData
NtUpdateWnfStateData
onecore\internal\sdk\inc\wil/Staging.h
CMD Internal Error %s
Null environment
APerformUnaryOperation: '%c'
APerformArithmeticOperation: '%c'
IsDebuggerPresent
SetConsoleInputExeNameW
RaiseFailFastException
RtlNtStatusToDosErrorNoTeb
RtlDllShutdownInProgress
RtlDisownModuleHeapAllocation
NtQueryInformationProcess
Copyright (c) Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved.
onecore\base\cmd\StartShellExecServiceProvider.h
onecore\base\cmd\maxpathawarestring.cpp
```

xxd

Prints a hexdump of a file

Good to look for recognizable hex patterns or perform advanced hex manipulation

Usage:

xxd <FILE>

```
00025a40: d508 de91 1600 65b9 c62a 9b8b ac88 d919
                                                   .....e..*....
00025a50: 4f3b 881d 7db3 5f44 5df8 5b50 9dca 468c
                                                   0;..}._D].[P..F.
         8a79 24f6 ac65 f0f4 f681 8301 28cf f10e
                                                   .y$..e....(...
00025a70: 723b d2df 7339 ad74 3c54 df6a 2aa3 134a
                                                   r;..s9.t<T.j*..J
00025a80: a8bf 2e00 207f 2a85 6eae 4b98 9f73 2677
                                                   .... .*.n.K..s&w
00025a90:
         6587 24d7 b31d 325b 8244 8385 e76e 318a
                                                   e.$...2[.D...n1.
00025aa0: 8e5b 2893 f773 c48c 0f4e 0722 856e c16e
                                                   .[(..s...N.".n.n
00025ab0: e78e 4aeb 2b0f 3214 639e 8475 f635 1cc9
                                                   ..J.+.2.c..u.5..
         6aac d1dd 58c6 08ec 3230 6bd5 e7d0 ac2e
                                                   j...X...20k....
                                                   c.G.......5.'.m.
         6310 4702 c6cb cef1 eddb 3597 2784 6da4
              9ecc 641b 8871 8c13 44af d06a 299e
                                                   a/..d..a..D..i).
00025af0: 4e6d 74f6 20c9 091e 841e 950b 5858 1001
                                                   Nmt. .....XX...
                                                   ....zK.0..4.B.
00025b00:
         99a3 1eb8 cd7a 4bf8 30bc a434 db42 9c60
00025b10: 6315 5ae3 c39f 67b9 fb3c 7961 b4b6 ec71
                                                   c.Z...g..<ya...q
00025b20: c569
              cc4a a4cf 3e9f 488b cc1f 67b9 322e
                                                   .i.J..>.H...a.2.
         38ca e2a9 1d26 52a5 4b2b 919c 66bb 49ec
                                                   8....&R.K+..f.I.
         ae61 6cf9 7e62 0efd eb39 a326 4236 141d
                                                   .al.~b...9.&B6..
00025b50:
         f230
              2ab9 d8a7 4dbd 9181 1e95 a8c4 108e
                                                   .0*...M......
00025b60:
         fd08 6aaf 3457 a1bc cdae ac9c 6715 d288
                                                   ..j.4W.....g...
00025b70: e577 f31b 2a07 0067 a8f5 a97c eda8 487c
                                                   .w..*..g...|..H|
00025b80: 03c7 d6a1 c8c9 d267 2524 f76f f248 0918
                                                   ....g%$.o.H..
00025b90: e7e5 aaf9 ff00 63f4 aec6 4f99 3681 9350
                                                   .....c...0.6..P
00025ba0: 7952 ff00 cf31 f90a a524 4b8b 3fff d9
                                                   yR...1...$K.?..
```



grep

Search for text matches within a file or recursively in files!

```
grep "text you want to find" <FILE>
grep -R "text you want to find" <DIRECTORY>
```

Combine with other utilities!

```
cat <FILE> | grep "text"
strings <FILE> | grep "text"
```



Steganography

It sucks



Steganography

- Hide data in other data

- Inherently guessy during CTFs
 - Try lots of ideas
 - Waste lots of time
 - Use statistical approaches if applicable





Image Stego - LSB

- LSB (least significant bit) encoding
- Not really useful in the real world, but CTFs love it
- Take the least significant bit (last bit) of each color byte and concatenate all of them to form a message
- Image is mostly visibly unchanged



Image Stego - LSB



Message = $(R \& 1) \parallel (G \& 1) \parallel (B \& 1) = 001...$



Can you tell the difference?









LSB Encoded



Can you tell the difference?



Original (Red, Bit 0)



LSB Encoded (Red, Bit 0)



Other Stego

Audio stego

- 90 % of the time it is a spectrogram
- The other 10% is either
 - SSTV
 - Some frequency modulation
 - Some other guessy home-brewed bullshit
- Most audio stego can be solved with tools



Starting Point

- What kind of file is it?
 - Use a command like file or binwalk to identify what a file is using magic bytes
 - If it's an image/video/audio, it likely contains hidden information in the form of steganography
 - If it's a document, there might be hidden information in the file format (did you know that a .docx file is just a ZIP archive?)
 - If it's plain text ASCII, what does it contain? Are there any patterns?
 - If it's a binary file, what readable strings are there? Are there patterns in the hexadecimal representation?
- What metadata does it have?
 - Images: location, camera model, encoding
 - Documents: username of creator, directory where saved
 - Everything else



Filesystem Forensics

Log analysis, filesystem/disk



Logs

- Logs provide valuable information about what happened on the system
- You can construct a list of events that occur to determine entry point of an attack and what an attacker did

Linux:

- /var/log/http/access.log
- /var/log/syslog
- other various service logs

Windows:

- Event Viewer



Starting Point

What we are given:

- An archive/zip of the full/partial filesystem
 - We can inspect logs, user files, command history, etc.
- A disk image file (.dd, .iso, .vhd)
 - Follows a filesystem format (e.g. NTFS, ext4)
 - Deleted files can be present and ignored by the filesystem format
 - We can mount it to a live system to examine the contents
- Live access to a system
 - Extremely difficult to perform forensics on a live system while maintaining integrity of evidence since it is volatile
 - Obtain a disk image after attempting to preserve live system evidence



Memory Forensics



Memory Forensics

Instead of being given a traditional filesystem, you are given the contents of memory or RAM in the form of a dump file

- Dump files are usually created when a program crashes or your OS crashes for debugging purposes
- They can contain sensitive information that was located in memory at the time of crashing
 - Passwords in your password manager
 - Clipboard content at time of crash



Volatility

- Analyze memory dump files
- There are two versions of Volatility:
 - Volatility 2.6
 - Is older, but works great when it works
 - Is limited to older OS versions (e.g. doesn't have latest Windows 10 symbols)
 - Intended to be used standalone
 - Volatility 3
 - Complete framework rewrite, under development, and missing some features
 - Is way faster and has better OS version profiling and support
 - Intended to be used as a library with standalone support
 - Annoyingly enough, also has versions such as 2.4.1

Setting up Volatility

```
git clone https://github.com/volatilityfoundation/volatility3.git
cd volatility3
pip install -r requirements.txt
python3 vol.py -f <FILE> windows.pslist
```

		py -f MEMORY.DMP ramework 2.4.1	windows.pslist										
	ss: 100		PDB scanning fi	nished									
PID	PPID	ImageFileName	Offset(V)		Handles	Session:	Id	Wow64 C	reateTime	ExitTim	e	File output	-
4	Θ	System 0xb50a3	627ь040 137	_	N/A	False	2022-11-	-17 23:06:	49.000000	N/A	Disabl	ed88 4	
Dis	abled												
260	4	smss.exe	0xb50a39093040	2		N/A	False	2022-11-1	7 23:06:49.	000000	N/A	Disabled	
388	376	csrss.exe	0xb50a36fb8140	12	-	0	False	2022-11-1	7 23:06:54.	.000000	N/A	Disabled	
460	376	wininit.exe	0xb50a39790080	1	-	0	False	2022-11-1	7 23:06:54.	.000000	N/A	Disabled	
468	452	csrss.exe	0xb50a397f7140	14	-	1	False	2022-11-1	7 23:06:54.	000000	N/A	Disabled	
556	452	winlogon.exe	0xb50a39e4b080	6	-	1	False	2022-11-1	7 23:06:55.	000000	N/A	Disabled	
596	460	services.exe	0xb50a39e4a140	8	_	0	False	2022-11-1	7 23:06:55.	000000	N/A	Disabled	
612	460	lsass.exe	0xb50a39e5d0c0	11	_	0	False	2022-11-1	7 23:06:55.	000000	N/A	Disabled	
708	596	svchost.exe	0xb50a39ecb280	1	-	0	False	2022-11-1	7 23:06:56.	000000	N/A	Disabled	
732	556	fontdrvhost.ex	0xb50a39f07180	5	-	1	False	2022-11-1	7 23:06:56.	000000	N/A	Disabled	
740	460	fontdrvhost.ex	0xb50a39f09180	5	-	0	False	2022-11-1	7 23:06:56.	.000000	N/A	Disabled	
748	596	svchost.exe	0xb50a39f0b280	24	-	0	False	2022-11-1	7 23:06:56.	000000	N/A	Disabled	
852	596	svchost.exe	0xb50a39fc4300	15	-	0	False	2022-11-1	7 23:06:56.	000000	N/A	Disabled	

Or... just use basic commands

A lot of memory is simply stored as strings!

```
strings <FILE> | grep "text"

strings --encoding=l <FILE> | grep "text"
```



Next Meetings

2022-11-19 - This Saturday

- Sunshine CTF 2022
- Join us virtually to compete in UCF's CTF!

2022-12-01 - Thursday After Break

- PWN II with Kevin
- Learn how to exploit format strings for PWN

2022-12-04 - Sunday After Break

- Graduate talk with Jaron Mink
- Security Unleashed Part 4



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